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Objectives: To describe the impact and policy response to the COVID-19 Pandemic on Norway and the 
implications this has for future policy development and Norwegian society. 
Methods: Documentary analysis of publicly available statistics, government documents and media 
sources. 
Results: Three different agendas motivated Norwegian policy: stemming the spread of the virus domes- 
tically, mitigating the impact on the economy and addressing the social costs of the policy response. 
Conclusions: The oil and gas industry and the Sovereign Wealth Fund have permitted Norway to manage 
the costs of the pandemic. But may also lead to a shift in government priorities in health, social and 
economic policy. 
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This article describes the response to the COVID-19 epidemic
n Norway. The Norwegian context provides a number of distinc-
ive elements that make it an interesting case for considering gov-
rnment thinking, the policy response and the engagement of the
ublic in a global crisis. Norway has a special relationship with the
ther Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden) in-
luding significant policy transfer and favourable treatment on a
ange of issues. While operating a Bevridgean publicly funded na-
ional health system, the dispersed population of Norway creates
articular challenges in terms of travel, provision and access. In
ommon with the other Nordic countries, the Norwegian popula-
ion exercises significant trust in the state which operates within
 consensual form of policy making. Finally, the oil and gas sector
s extremely important to the Norwegian economy constituting in
018 18% of GDP and 62% of exports. As the seventh largest ex-
orter of crude oil internationally, the collapse of the oil price in-
vitably has implications for government policy responses to the
OVID-19 crisis. ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: goril.ursin@nord.no (G. Ursin), ingunn.skjesol@nord.no 
(I. Skjesol), j.tritter@aston.ac.uk (J. Tritter). 
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Please cite this article as: G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter, The COVID-
framing the policy response, Health Policy and Technology, https://doi.Initially we describe the characteristics of Norway and its popu-
ation before considering the organisation and utilisation of health
ervices. We go on to detail the policy responses to the COVID-19
risis before reflecting on the implications and distinctive aspects
f the Norwegian policy response. In particular, we consider the
ustification for the evolution of the government response and the
ay that the social implications of lockdown shaped the policy dis-
ourse. 
orway and the Norwegian health system 
Norway is a prosperous country with a population of 5.3 mil-
ion and a GDP per capita of €43,900. It is a high tax economy with
he top personal income tax rate of 47.8% and corporate tax rate
f 22% and an overall tax burden of 38.2% of domestic income. Life
xpectancy at birth is the third highest in the EU at 82.7 [1] with a
mall education gap, although women live an average of 3.3 years
onger than men. The over-65-year old’s make up 17% of the popu-
ation with a median age of 39.5 and an elderly dependency rate of
6.9 [1] . Most of the population is concentrated in the south of the
ountry and 83% live in urban areas but there are significant dis-
ersed populations as the overall population density in 2016 was
4.3 people per square kilometre of land area [2] . 
Norway has a healthy population with limited health dispari-
ies, but ischemic heart disease is the single largest cause of death.an open access article under the CC BY license. 
19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in 
org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.004 
2 G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter / Health Policy and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: HLPT [m5G; September 4, 2020;21:42 ] 
Fig. 1. Number of reported COVID-19 cases by date as of 13 August 2020. 
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. a: Deaths by age and gender compared to total Norwegian population by age and gender Fig. 2 b. 
Fig. 3. Number of confirmed COVID-19 cases by age and gender as of 13 August 2020. 
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h  One in seven adults is obese, there are low levels of smoking (10%
of adults) but other forms of tobacco use have risen over the last
20 years [1] . In part, due to high taxation, alcohol consumption for
adults and adolescents is low at just under seven litres per person
per year. 
Like other Nordic countries and the United Kingdom, Spain,
Italy and New Zealand, Norway has a public financed national
healthcare system (a Bevridgean system) providing universal cov-
erage for all residents financed through general taxation (74%),
the national insurance scheme (11%) and private expenditure (15%)
while private health insurance is marginal covering less than 5%
of elective services [1] . Co-payment is capped but relates pri-Please cite this article as: G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter, The COVID-
framing the policy response, Health Policy and Technology, https://doi.arily to dental care and outpatient pharmaceuticals. In 2017,
orway spent 10.4% of GDP on health or €4,545 per capita
1] . 
A decentralised system, the government owns the four regional
ealth authorities that manage hospital services and employ staff.
he municipalities manage primary care, long-term care and social
ervices and general practitioners are self-employed but integrated
nto the public system via contracts. The for-profit hospital sector
s tiny providing less than 0.2% of hospital stays and 7% of daytime
tays [1] . 
Prior to the Pandemic there were 2.9 physicians (2018 WB), 3.9
ospital beds (2013 WB) and 18.2 nurses and midwives (2018 WB)19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in 
org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.004 
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Fig. 4. New patients admitted to ICU by date as of 13 August 2020. 
Table 1 
Norwegian government COVID-19 policies (issued 12 March 2020). 
Government recommendations 
Hand hygiene and cough 
etiquette 
Wash hands frequently and thoroughly 
Avoid shaking hands and hugging people you do not live with. 
Cough or sneeze into a paper tissue or the crook of your elbow. 
Work from home Home working should be used if possible 
Public transport Use of public transport should be avoided 
Domestic travel Limit leisure travel in Norway 
Health institutions No visits to members of vulnerable groups 
Mandated by law with potential sanctions 
Stay at Home People with respiratory tract infection symptoms must stay at home until at least 1 day 
after they feel completely well. 
Home Quarantine People who travelled abroad must quarantine in their home for 14 days from the day they 
returned to the country. Backdated to 27.02.2020. Exception for travel from Finland and 
Sweden. 
People who have been in close contact with someone with a confirmed case of COVID-19 
must home quarantine for 14 days. 
Those in quarantine must remain at home and not attend school or work. They can go 
outside, carry out necessary shopping maintaining social distancing of at least 1 metre but 
not use public transport. 
People who live in the same household are not quarantined. 
Home isolation People with confirmed COVID-19 must be isolated at home or in a healthcare institution 
else. The isolation lasts until 3 days after you have recovered and at least 8 days after you 
became ill. 
They can go outside in private garden or balcony and should try to maintain social distance 
from others in their household; people in the same household are in quarantine. 
Closure Educational institutions (from Kindergarten to Higher Education) Exception: Open to 
children of key workers up to 10, and children with special needs 
Restaurants, bars, pubs and clubs. Exception: If they can serve food to customers 
maintaining social distancing of 1 metre. 
Fitness centres, swimming pools and waterparks. 
Hairdressers, tattoo and piercing parlours, massage studios, spas and beauty parlours. 
Cancelled/postponed All organised sports activities, competitions and cultural events. 
International travel ban Applies to healthcare professionals with patient contact. 
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i  er 1,0 0 0 population. In 2010, Norway had approximately 300 ICU
eds [3] . 
OVID-19 trends in Norway 
The National Institute of Public Health started testing for
OVID-19 on 23 January, registered the first incidence on 26 Febru-
ry and the first death caused by COVID-19 on 12 March 2020.
he Norwegian National Institute of Public Health (NIPH) has over-
een all data collection and measurements since COVID-19 was
rst listed as a notifiable disease in Norway on 31 January. By the
3 August NIPH has published 11 reports updating Covid-19 data.
unicipalities are responsible for detecting, reporting and surveil-
ng the spread of infectious diseases therefore, the Municipality
irector of Public Health has local oversight over COVID-19 test-Please cite this article as: G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter, The COVID-
framing the policy response, Health Policy and Technology, https://doi.ng which is performed by a nasopharynx and throat test or by a
lood test, and analysed using PCR-technology [4] . Initially testing
ook place in hospitals, but later special testing sites were estab-
ished in municipalities, but all the samples were analysed in hos-
ital laboratories and the results submitted electronically directly
o the Norwegian Surveillance System for Communicable Diseases
MSIS) Laboratory database. There is little evidence of delays in ac-
ess to tests or results. 
The first nationally televised press conference was held by the
overnment on 10 March 2020 and continued daily until 8 April.
hereafter, press conferences were held three times a week and
rom 15 June were only held when needed but at least once a
eek. The Prime-Minister, Health Minister and Head of the NIPH
ere all present initially, while later the panel included the Min-
ster of Education and Integration and the Minister of Justice and19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in 
org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.004 
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Fig. 5. Confirmed COVID-19 cases country heatmap as of 13 August 2020. 
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s  Public Security. Links to streamed press conferences, written in-
formation and reports are available through government web sites
with daily updates. While data is available at regional and county
level, municipalities have been active in adopting a range of com-
munications strategies in order to reach their citizens using daily
press conferences, local newspapers, radio and twitter. 
Plotting the course of COVID-19 in Norway 
The NIPH monitors the evolution of COVID-19 and has pub-
lished daily reports since 12 March on their website. As of 13 Au-
gust, a total 518,893 (see Fig. 1 ) people have been tested [5] . 
As of 13 August, 257 COVID-19 related deaths had been re-
ported or 5.4 per 10 0,0 0 0 population [6] . The average age of death
is 82 years. The peak of deaths associated with COVID-19 was the
week of 6 April and includes those who died of and with COVID-
19. In total, more men have died than women but due to the inter-
action between age and gender there have been more female than
male deaths among 90 + (see Fig. 2 ) [6] . 
By 13 of August 9783 cases of COVID-19 had been reported and
a total of 1233 patients admitted to hospital in Norway, 180 cases
per 10 0,0 0 0 [6] . This figure grew from 8383 total cases by 29 April
but exhibits little obvious gender pattern (See Fig. 3 ). With an av-
erage age of 59 the 230 patients admitted to ICU up to 13 August
(4.3 per 10 0,0 0 0 population) (See Fig. 4 ), were 75% male and 63%
had at least one risk factor such as age, obesity (BMI > 30), gen-
der, comorbidity, ethnicity and low socioeconomic status [6] . There
is no available data on length of hospital stay. According to the
NIPH modelling published on 12 August the scenario based on an
R = 1.1 suggests a peak of Covid-19 patients in hospitals and pa-
tients in hospital needing ventilator treatment in April-May 2021;
the current R value is 1 [7] . The first reported cases in Norway
were among those who had travelled abroad while the first case
without direct contact was reported on 9 March [6] . On 28 Febru-
ary two medical doctors were infected but there are no published
statistics on the number of health care professionals with COVID-
19. Oslo (the capital and largest city in Norway) has the highest
level of infection (24,2 per 10 0,0 0 0 population), double the na-
tional average (10,4 per 10 0,0 0 0 population) [8] (see Fig. 5 ). Far
higher rates of infection have been recorded among those not born
in Norway. Between 13 July and 2 August 43% of all Covid-19 cases
were associated with the immigrant population [6] . 
Norwegian policy road map 
On 12 March the Norwegian Government presented new poli-
cies intended to limit and delay the COVID-19 outbreak [9] . Regula-
tions ranged from advice on avoiding infection through restrictions
to travel and group meetings and enforced closure of restaurants,
coffee shops and pubs if social distancing between customers was
not maintained (See Table 1 ) [10] . Violations were punishable by
fines or imprisonment for up to six months, but there have been
very few cases of the authorities issuing fines. 
Another set of policies related to the economic impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the consequences of the movement re-
strictions: a work furlough scheme and loan guarantees for busi-
nesses. On 13 March, the government announced a 20-day fur-
lough scheme to be implemented on 20 March. Usually when an
employee is made redundant, the employer is responsible for pay-
ing the first 15 days; for the employee, following a three-day stop
in pay they can receive unemployment benefits from the state. The
new furlough scheme reduced the period the employer was re-
sponsible to pay to two days, followed by an 18-day period where
the state provided the payment; beyond the 20-day period an in-
dividual could apply for unemployment benefits. The notification
period to the employee was cut from 14 to two days to supportPlease cite this article as: G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter, The COVID-
framing the policy response, Health Policy and Technology, https://doi.usinesses that were shut down overnight. A further flexibility for
mployers was that employees could be furloughed part-time (up
o 50%) and therefore could continue to be in contact with and
ontributing to their workplace. The intention was to support com-
anies to rotate staff on furlough within a business to try to limit
nemployment. 
The Norwegian government response also relies heavily on loan
uarantees to the private sector. Government loan guarantees for
mall and medium enterprises were announced on 15 March, pre-
ented to Parliament on the 20 th and implemented on the 27 th .
his scheme was extended to all private firms including those with
ore than 250 employees on 2 April. On the 19 th of March 6 bil-
ion NOK loan guarantees for the aviation industry were agreed in-
luding specific protection for particular domestic routes and aboli-
ion of the air-passenger tax from 1 January-31 October while air-
ort taxes paid by the carriers were cancelled from 1 January-31
une. 
On 29 May the Government initiated a new policy phase, where
ovement control measures were scaled back, and economic mea-
ures were revised to increase economic activity and help the un-
mployed return to work. The new measures were; 1) a tempo-
ary subsidy scheme for companies to take back temporarily laid
ff workers, 2) measures to underpin activity in the construction
ector, 3) a green transition package, 4) government purchase of air19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in 
org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.004 
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Table 2 
COVID-19 testing criteria and prioritization by date of implementation. 
Date implemented Priority Testing where there is suspect COVID-19 
8 February 1 Patients in need of hospital admission 
2 Patients/residents of nursing homes or healthcare facilities 
3 Patient-facing healthcare professionals 
4 At risk population: 65 + , serious or poorly managed long-term conditions 
5 Individuals quarantined due to close contact with a confirmed case of COVID-19 or 
after international travel 
20 April 6 Employee, child or pupil in a re-opened childcare centre, school or after-school 
programme 
24 April Post-mortem tests where there is suspicion of COVID-19 
7 May 7 Others with suspected COVID-19 disease 
Those on priority 6-7 tested after home monitoring of symptoms for 2 days 
25 May 8 Nursing home residents who are asymptomatic 
10 June All those with suspected COVID-19 should be tested. 
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s  nd train routes from private providers, 5) a compensation scheme
or statutory maintenance expenses in seasonal businesses with se-
ere income loss, 6) increased education funding and 7) measures
o strengthen integration. Fig. 6 provides a diagram of the evolu-
ion of the full range of Norwegian COVID-19 policies. 
In the press conference on 7 May the government presented a
lan to gradually open the national borders for travel, emphasis-
ng that it would be the development of the pandemic that would
egulate which countries would be permitted access for travel. The
rst step was to be opening travel between the Nordic countries
n 15 June. On 12 June a new system to communicate travel per-
itted without quarantine restrictions was launched. Travel access
as based on a set of criteria and regions assessed as safe would
e published every other week in the form of a map [11] . The first
ssessment resulted in opening borders to all the Nordic coun-
ries except Sweden. Initially travel to the island of Gotland, part
f Sweden, without quarantine was permitted although on 15 June
ll of Sweden was excluded from quarantine free travel (see Fig. 7 ).
In a press conference on 10 July The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
resented new regulations on travel permitting quarantine-free
ravel from 15 July for all countries within the Schengen area/EEA
xcept for Portugal, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria
nd Romania. Applying the same set of criteria as for the Nordic
egion, the government will continue, every other week, to assess
ny changes in the list of countries that can be visited without
uarantine restrictions. 
Initially the nationally provided information on COVID-19 was
rimarily about symptoms, the spread of the disease and preven-
ion strategies. On 12 March, the government launched multiple
trategies to contain the virus by closing national borders, schools
nd nurseries, prohibiting cultural and sports events and estab-
ishing national quarantine regulations. These responses were en-
hrined in a time-limited Corona Law on 18 March that extended
he authority of the Prime Minister to act during the crisis. 
From 14 March, there was a shift in the content and nature
f the information disseminated focusing more on government re-
ponses to the economic consequences of the pandemic and quar-
ntine regulations such as the work furlough scheme or the loss of
easonal agricultural workers. Increasingly, the social consequences
f the situation have become the focus of government communica-
ion and the political discourse underpinning the policy response;
oneliness, isolation, insecurity and the impact on young people
nd the delays in processing welfare claims and especially those
ssociated with unemployment and the furlough scheme. 
Alongside the evolution of policy there were also changes in
OVID-19 testing criteria (See Table 2 ) [12] . Due to the low lev-
ls of COVID-19 virus in Norway large-scale population testing was
ever recommended by the NIPH. Until 25 May, people who were
symptomatic were not tested as a negative result might not in- c  
Please cite this article as: G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter, The COVID-
framing the policy response, Health Policy and Technology, https://doi.icate that an individual is in the incubation period, and therefore
ight give a false sense of security. Testing with nasopharyngeal or
ropharyngeal swabs requires trained personnel and close contact
etween the person being tested and health personnel, this is re-
ource intensive and risks further spreading the disease. Therefore,
rom 15 June the Norwegian Health Directorate together with Oslo
unicipality piloted a test using self-collected saliva samples. This
on-invasive test requires minimal equipment and no close contact
etween test subject and the health personnel [13] . Municipalities
ere informed on 9 August that from 12 August testing should be
vailable to any person with suspected infection without requiring
 physician referral. Some municipalities provide drop-in services
or testing, while others require a booked appointment. 
orwegian health care system response 
Norway has 250 ICU beds, and 500 beds that can be upgraded
o critical care [14] . Current modelling suggests that the peak of
he epidemic will occur between May and October potentially re-
uiring 60 0-120 0 ICU beds [14] . Hospitals were given authority to
ancel planned activity and reallocate beds to increase the number
f ICU beds, this has led to a significant increase in waiting lists.
here has been very little attention to the response to COVID-19
rom primary care. There has been little public or government dis-
ussion, apart from restrictions on home visits and no reallocation
f work or staff. 
Providing critical care requires specially trained health care pro-
essionals, especially nurses. Many hospitals created digital edu-
ation on infection control and for health care professionals who
ere not in daily practice in order to reallocate nurses from other
ards to ICU [15] . Nursing students in their final year of an under-
raduate degree were permitted to apply for temporary authoriza-
ion to work in hospitals to increase the size of the health work-
orce; this was parallel to the existing opportunity available to final
ear medical students [16] . 
Effective inf ection control requires personal protection equip-
ent such as facemasks, gloves and face shields. Many hospitals
nd health care facilities had very little infection control equip-
ent at the beginning of March, orders and distribution of such
quipment was then centralised to prioritize institutions with the
reatest need [17] . Municipal health care facilities (primarily res-
dential elderly care) and home care services, and general practi-
ioners had to submit their orders though a national contact point
long with hospitals [18] . Private initiatives to assist in producing
acemasks and shields were encouraged to increase the available
upply of PPE for use in health care facilities. 
Even though the government prioritized the transport of food,
upplies and pharmaceuticals, many people living with long-term
onditions feared for their own health. Because of limited sup-19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in 
org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.004 
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Fig. 6. The evolution of Norwegian COVID-19 policies. 
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Fig. 7. Regions opened for travel without requiring a quarantine period. 
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e  lies and to combat hoarding the availability of seven pharmaceu-
icals was restricted: oxazepam (Xanax), insulin, metformin, Az-
tromcin (antiboticum), prednisolon, plaquentil and Paracetamol
19] . 
Norway is part of an international collaboration for the devel-
pment of vaccines (The Coalition of Epidemic preparedness inno-
ations) that started work developing a vaccine against COVID-19
n January. Norway has donated NOK36 million to develop the vac-
ines [20] . 
ealth technology response 
Norway’s technology response was primarily focussed and track
nd trace. In part this is due to the existing highly developed elec-
ronic records system in Norway and the technology that under-
ins the centralised health information system. The “Smittestopp”
pp was released on 16 April. The app collects anonymised data
bout movement patterns as well as notifies users if they have
een in close contact with a person that later is confirmed as in-
ected with COVID-19. This requires that those who are infected
lso download and register with the app. By 19 March more than
.5 million people had downloaded the app [21] . An expert com-
ittee assessed the technology and concluded that it requires fur-
her development as it stored too much personal information [22] .
n 12 June the Norwegian Data Protection Authority warned the
overnment that continuing to collect data that was not being
nalysed due to the extremely low numbers of infections contra-
ened the law. In response, on 15 June, the NIPH announced that
ll data collection was being stopped, data already collected wouldPlease cite this article as: G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter, The COVID-
framing the policy response, Health Policy and Technology, https://doi.e deleted and advising members of the public to deactivate the
pp. 
The key role of municipalities in detecting, reporting and
urveiling the spread of the pandemic prompted digital solution
o making the relevant data available to inform policy at both na-
ional and regional levels. The NIPH collaborated with The Nor-
egian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) and se-
ected the District Health Information Software 2 (DHIS2). A mo-
ile phone application that permits offline data capture DHIS2 is
n open source, web-based health management information sys-
em platform, that makes it possible to generate analyses from data
n real time [23] . Previously the software was used by low and
iddle income countries to track infection disease but in collab-
ration with the WHO a group led by the University of Oslo de-
eloped a module specifically for the COVID-19 pandemic [24] . All
unicipalities were given access to the Norwegian version through
 national web page on 5 June. 
conomic and financial fluctuation 
Norway, like so many other countries has faced the challenge
f the loss of revenues due to the dramatic decline of the econ-
my as well as the cost of delivering increased levels of health ser-
ices and schemes to support employers and employees. However,
orway has also faced a significant decline in the oil price that
reates a direct challenge to the national budget from petroleum
nd tax revenues and an indirect challenge related to the con-
raction of a significant industrial sector. Table 3 summarizes the
stimated costs of the policies put in place to support the econ-19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in 
org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.004 
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Table 3 
Estimated costs of economic stimulus measures (NOK billions) (as of 8 June 2020). 
Mitigate income loss for businesses including compensation for large losses 74.1 
Aviation sector loss provision and guarantee scheme 14.1 
Government guaranteed loans to businesses through the banking system 10.0 
Counteract loss of income for individuals 27.3 
Strengthening critical infrastructure sectors 23.3 
Other compensation schemes 7.2 
Other measures 6.1 
Increased spending on unemployment benefits 23.9 
Total 186.0 
Fig. 8. Number of unemployed by type of unemployment 3 March - 5 May. 
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t  omy [25] . Overall, it is estimated that tax revenues will decline by
NOK59.4bn while the government budget balance is expected to
weaken by NOK245.4bn. 
In part, these costs are due to the significant increase in lev-
els of unemployment which has doubled since the outbreak of
COVID-19 and as of 3 July 232,734 individuals were fully unem-
ployed [26] . This is apparent in Fig. 8 as following the expansion
of the furlough scheme on 24 March the number of fully unem-
ployed declined while those in partial unemployment (including
those on the furlough scheme) increased. Despite these interven-
tions the number of fully unemployed remains more than double
the number at the beginning of March 2020 and the seasonally ad-
justed unemployment rate (average from April-June) is 4.6%. 
In response to the significant costs incurred by policies and the
drop in oil revenues on 12 May the Government proposed a re-
vised state budget for 2020. The new budget entails the use of
NOK382bn ( €34.6bn) from the Sovereign Wealth fund rather than
the planned NOK3.9bn inflow to the fund. The revised budget in-
cludes the structural oil-corrected budget deficit, or the amount
of petroleum revenue included in the budget has increased to
NOK419.6bn from the NOK243.6bn announced in the October bud-
get [27] . The revised budget was considered by parliament on 19
June. 
There has also been a significant impact on the Norwegian eco-
nomic and financial context due to the COVID-19 pandemic (see
Fig. 9 ). The Norwegian stock market, OSEAX fell by more than 34%
but has rallied in line with other international financial markets
but remains 10% below the level at the beginning of 2020. Nor-
wegian currency markets have also been affected, the rate against
the US$ dropped by 26% to a historic low on 22 March and re-
mains 3% below the start of the year. Against the Euro the pattern d  
Please cite this article as: G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter, The COVID-
framing the policy response, Health Policy and Technology, https://doi.s similar with the Norwegian Krona weakening over the course
f the pandemic reaching a low point on 22 March before rallying
ut remaining almost 7% below the first of January level. In re-
ponse the Norwegian central bank, Norges Bank, is “Continuously
onsidering whether there is a need to intervene in the market by
urchasing Norwegian Kroner” [28] . This has been followed by the
entral bank cutting interest rates to a record low of zero and fore-
ast that they would remain there until at least 2023. The 0.25%
ut was part of a 1.5% cut over the period since March [29] . 
The oil and gas industry is central to the Norwegian economy
nd the oil price crash continues to have a significant impact. Nor-
ay produces 2% of the world’s oil supply but on 29 April the Oil
nd Energy Minister, Tina Bru, announced that Norway would cut
il production by 13% in June; the first cut in production for 18
ears. Norway’s state-owned operator Equinor announced capital
xpenditure and exploration cuts as part of its £3 billion COVID-19
ction plan, the suspension of a share buyback program, and set
p a department with the aim of preserving production and the
obs it supports in the North Sea [30] . 
onclusions and policy implications 
Norway acted quickly to stem the spread of the virus domes-
ically, and limit infection from abroad while increasing health
ervice capacity. The policy emphasis quickly shifted to concerns
bout economic impacts, the need to buttress both employers and
mployees and support specific industries such as domestic air
ravel. Most recently, concerns about the social cost of the imple-
entation of the lock down procedures and the need to mitigate
he consequences has shaped policies relating to the easing of lock
own procedures. This attention to the social aspects, and the abil-19 pandemic in Norway: The dominance of social implications in 
org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.004 
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Fig. 9. Financial market reaction to major policy events in Norway (in percentage change from 1 January 2020). 
i  
w  
r  
w
 
r  
t  
c  
i  
t  
c  
a  
m  
t  
1  
p  
s  
s  
b  
g  
a  
t
 
w  
t  
v  
n  
a  
t  
b
 
g  
t  
t  
e  
m  
fl  
c  
a  
n  
f
 
t  
W  
i  
t  
h  
t  
s  
t  
1  
d  
r  
i
 
i  
f  
c  
s  
p
 
g  
d  
m  
s  
c  
a  
t  
i  
c  
T  
s  
f  
h  
o  
p  
S  
r  
a  
l
F
E
D
R
 
 ty to fund these, we believe, is a key differentiator of the Nor-
egian response. As the Norwegian Prime Minister, Erna Solberg,
eflected, “The government has chosen to prioritise children, then
orking life, and finally other activities.” [31] . 
Services for vulnerable children and youth were considerably
educed during the first stage of fighting the pandemic. Most of
he low threshold services for children and young people where
losed due to social distancing and many of the social care workers
n these services were reallocated to other parts of the health sys-
em. In addition, the rate of referrals to child welfare services de-
lined dramatically, and collaboration across services was reported
s more problematic [32] . Despite the decline in provision and for-
al demand a large-scale epidemiological investigation assessing
he prevalence of depression and anxiety associated with COVID-
9 mitigation strategies found a two to threefold increase in de-
ressive and anxiety symptoms in individuals experiencing the re-
trictions [33] . A study of quality of life between 9 and 29 March
howed that people were more concerned after the COVID-19 out-
reak regulations were implemented. The groups expressing the
reatest increase in level of concern were single people under the
ge of 45 and immigrants, followed by parents with children under
he age of 17 [34] . This has implications for future health policies. 
Older people and those with compromised immune systems or
ith long-term conditions have also been particularly affected by
he regulations. For the families of many of these, being unable to
isit, or finding that those they loved died alone has been a sig-
ificant source of anxiety and further grief. To address this issue
nd relieve social stress, the government announced on 27 May
hat visits by family members to residential facilities and to attend
irths would be permitted. 
The significant outbreak of COVID-19 cases among the immi-
rant population especially in Oslo was, at least in part related to
he communication strategy that had been adopted. The response,
he provision of information in a range of minority languages and
ngagement with community information as part of an engage-
ent strategy generated significant success. This has forced a re-
ection by health authorities on the need to consider indirect pro-
esses of discrimination such as defining an immigrant community
s ‘problematic’. As a consequence, health authorities now recog-
ise the importance of engaging with such communities in a dif-
erent way. 
Despite these areas of concern, the Norwegian policy response
o COVID-19 is considered a success nationally and internationally.
hile there is a low level of community infection relying on herd
mmunity has never been an aspect of the Norwegian strategy. As
he Prime Minister explained on 7 May “up until now, the strategy
as been to stop the spread of the virus. We are now transitioning
o a control strategy. We have had the same aim all along, to en-
ure that the health services have the capacity to assist everyonePlease cite this article as: G. Ursin, I. Skjesol and J. Tritter, The COVID-
framing the policy response, Health Policy and Technology, https://doi.hat needs it, both patients in need of health care due to COVID-
9 and patients that need health care due to other reasons and
iseases.” It is unclear whether this policy will need to change in
esponse to current modelling suggesting a second wave peaking
n May 2021 [7] . 
Norway is a rich country, and the strength of the oil and gas
ndustry over the last 20 years, generating the Sovereign Wealth
und, has provided a buffer to the economic consequences of the
risis. Indeed, the need to draw on these reserves may also re-
hape the government’s orientation to the country’s economic de-
endence on this industrial sector. 
The 27 of February, the CEO of the Norwegian central bank, Yn-
ve Slyngstad, argues that Norway needed to shift from “an oil-
ependent nation to an oil fund nation” [35] . This echoed state-
ents by Norge Bank governor, Oystein Olsen who in his annual
peech stated, “If this transition to a less oil-dependent economy
ould happen gradually, I’m very optimistic. If you have a more
brupt changes in conditions or policies…that…would make the
ransition more challenging” [36] . Perhaps COVID-19 provides the
mpetus for this transition, a transition and a context that all, poli-
ymakers, business leaders and the population, feel is challenging.
here will inevitably be shifts in health policy, to ensure greater
ensitivity and responsiveness to immigrant populations, support
or vulnerable young people and greater attention to the mental
ealth consequences of isolation. But as telling will be the fall-
ut both from the economic consequences, the impact on em-
loyment particularly amongst young people and the challenge to
wedish policy leadership across the Nordic countries. The Swedish
esponse to COVID-19 has exposed a fracture in Nordic solidarity
pparent in the continued closure of borders; a fracture that is
ikely to echo in other aspects of policy. 
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